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ADVERSE POSSESSION OF MUNICIPAL LAND:
IT'S TIME TO PROTECT THIS VALUABLE ASSET
Paula R. Latovick*
The laws of several states regarding adverse possession of municipal
land vary widely from providing no protection to granting complete
immunity from such losa Generally, states that permit adverse
possession of municipally owned land do so without articulating a
rationale for allowing such a loss of a valuable municipal asset. In
this Article, Professor Latovick describes why the current state of the
law is unsatisfactory. She then considers the public policies raised by
the issue of adverse possession of municipal land. Professor Latovick
concludes by proposing that states should adopt legislation expressly
protecting all municipal land from adverse possession and by
suggesting model language for such statutes
INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of adverse possession provides that an owner of
land may lose the title to his land if he fails to eject trespassers
promptly. If the trespasser uses the land as his own for the
length of time specified in the state's statute of limitations,1 and
satisfies any additional common law and statutory require-
ments,2 the owner is barred from recovering possession of the
land from the trespasser.3
While statutes of limitation for the recovery of land have not
historically run against federal 4 and state governments,5 land
* Professor of Law, Thomas M. Cooley Law School. BA.. 1976, Michigan State
University-, J.D. 1980, University of Michigan Law School. The author wishes to
acknowledge and thank Daniel McCarthy for his help and support on this Article.
1. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 9.10.030 (Michie 1996); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-41-
101(1) (1982).
2. Typical common law requirements are that the possession be actual, open, notori-
ous, exclusive, adverse to the title of the true owner and continuous for the period prescribed
by the statute of limitations. See Mackinac Island Dev Co. v. Burton Abstract & Title Co., 349
N.W2d 191, 195 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); Ebell v. City of Baker, 299 P. 313,318 (Or. 1931).
3. While most adverse possession statutes of limitation speak only in terms of
preventing a lawsuit by the original owner to recover possession, see N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ 2A:14-6, -7, -8, -30, -31 (West 1987), the effect of satisfying the statutory time period
is to create a new title in the adverse possessor. See Devins v. Borough of Bogota, 592
A.2d 199, 201 (N.J. 1991); OKeeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 873-74 (N.J. 1980).
4. See 48 U.S.C. § 1489 (1994).
5. See ALASKA STAT. § 38.95.010 (Michie 1996); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 539:6
(1997). But see Paula R. Latovick, Adverse Possession Against the States: The Hornbooks
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owned by municipal entities has generally received decidedly less
protection. In a very few states, all land owned by cities and coun-
ties is expressly protected from adverse possession by statute.' A
number of other states protect limited categories of municipally
owned land by statute.7 Most states, however, leave municipally
owned land completely unprotected by statute. In those states, the
only protection, if any, has been provided by the courts.8
This Article contends that the current method for protecting
municipal land from adverse possession is inadequate in most
states. It examines the difficulties inherent in applying the gov-
ernmental/proprietary distinction, a test which has not adapted to
reflect the modem realities of municipal land ownership and
which does not recognize recent anti-development concerns. Noting
the large amount of municipal land at risk of adverse possession,
this Article concludes that states should enact statutes making all
municipal land expressly immune from adverse possession.
I. THE CURRENT METHOD OF PROTECTING MUNICIPALLY OWNED
LAND FROM ADVERSE POSSESSION IS INADEQUATE
A. The Dual Nature of Municipal Corporations
Historically, municipal corporations have been deemed to have
both governmental and private (proprietary) aspects.9 This dual
nature is important in the law of adverse possession because,
Have it Wrong, 29 U MICH. J.L. REFORM 939 (1996) (discussing the failure of states to
prevent adverse possession of state land by private parties).
6. See ALA. CODE § 6-2-31(b) (1993); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-41-101(2) (1982);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 15-1-51 (1995); see also discussion infra Part II.B.
7. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 22-1-202, -203 (Michie 1996) (protecting municipal wa-
terworks lands and public school system property); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.050(1)
(Michie 1992) (granting limited protection to streets, alleys, and other public ease-
ments); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.01 (West 1988) (protecting public ways, levees, squares,
and other grounds dedicated to public use); see also discussion infra Part II.C.
8. See Henry Cowell Lime & Cement Co. v. State, 114 P.2d 331, 332-33 (Cal.
1941) (acknowledging a rule that municipal land dedicated to a public use may not be
adversely possessed); Brown v. Trustees of Schools, 79 N.E. 579, 580 (Ill. 1906) (noting
that statutes of limitations do not generally run against the state or any municipalities
where public rights are implicated, based on the maxim of nullum tempus occurit regi
(time does not run against the sovereign)); Siejack v. City of Baltimore, 313 A.2d 843,
846 (Md. 1974) (noting a rule that property held by a municipal corporation for a public
use may not be adversely possessed); Devins, 592 A.2d at 200 (holding that municipal
property not dedicated to a public use is subject to adverse possession).
9. See 3 JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPO-
RATIONS § 1188, at 1887 (5th ed. 1911).
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while courts generally have protected land held in a govern-
mental capacity or dedicated to a public use from adverse
possession, they have permitted adverse possession of municipal
land held in a proprietary capacity.0 A municipal corporation1
has been described as:
[A] body politic and corporate, established by sovereign
power, evidenced by a charter, with a defined area, a popula-
tion, a corporate name, and perpetual succession, estab-
lished primarily to regulate the local or internal affairs of
the area incorporated, and secondarily to share in the civil
government of the state in the particular locality.
Thus, a municipal corporation is a subordinate branch of state
government entrusted with the administration of the local affairs
of an area for the benefit of the local community. States differ as
to whether a county constitutes a municipal corporation, some
treating it instead as a branch of state government with no cor-
porate characteristics."3
Although they constitute an important and integral part of our
system of government, municipal corporations have nonetheless
often been regarded as less than fully governmental in nature.
The law may treat them as hybrid entities, with both govern-
mental and private functions and characteristics.14 One court
noted the following distinction:
10. See discussion infra Part I.C.
11. For purposes of this Article, the terms "municipal corporation" and
"municipality" include towns, cities, parishes, and boroughs unless otherwise noted. The
rules discussed have also been applied, occasionally, to other "quasi-municipalities."
Examples of such quasi-municipalities include airport authorities, school districts,
boards of education, drainage districts, and water and sewer districts. See CHARLES S.
RHYNE, MUNICIPAL LAW § 1-4, at 6-7 (1957).
12. Id. at 2. For a discussion of the nature of municipal governments, focusing
mainly on the city of New York but also drawing authority from New England states,
see HENDRiK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER (1983). See also Joan
Williams, The Development of the Public IPrivate Distinction in American Law, 64 TEX.
L. REV. 225 (1985) (reviewing HARTOG, supra).
13. Counties have sometimes been described as "quasi-municipal corporations or-
ganized as subordinate agencies of the state government to aid in the proper
administration of state affairs with such powers and functions as the law prescribes."
See RHYNE, supra note 11, § 1-4, at 6. In some states, counties are considered to be mu-
nicipal corporations. See Neuenschwander v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Conm'n,
48 A.2d 593, 597 (Md. 1946). In other states, counties are deemed distinct from munici-
palities. One Florida case distinguished counties from municipalities because counties
are political divisions of the state under the state constitution, while municipalities are
not. See Keggin v. Hillsborough County, 71 So. 372, 373 (Fla. 1916).
14. "Although municipal corporations are public agencies, exercising, on behalf of
the State, public duties, yet they also exercise and acquire what the courts have called
WINTE 1998]
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A governmental function has to do with the administration
of some phase of government; that is to say, dispensing or
exercising some element of sovereignty. A proprietary func-
tion is one designed to promote the comfort, convenience,
safety and happiness of the citizens.... A governmental
function is necessary; a proprietary function ... is not.15
This governmental/proprietary distinction is important to the
issue of adverse possession because, while the courts have al-
most universally protected land held in a governmental
capacity from adverse possession, they have often permitted
adverse possession of land held in a proprietary capacity" The
remainder of this section will examine the theories and prac-
tices relating to this distinction, and will clarify the need for a
better approach.
B. The Governmental/Proprietary Distinction in Tort Law
There are several substantive legal areas where the charac-
terization of a municipality's actions as governmental or
proprietary is also important. Like adverse possession, the area
of municipal immunity from tort liability is affected by this dis-
tinction, and a brief discussion of this area is helpful to
illuminate the usefulness of the distinction. Municipalities are
generally immune from liability for injuries caused by their
agents while performing a governmental function, but they lose
their immunity where the function performed by the agent is
proprietary in nature.7
rights in a private and proprietary capacity rather than in a public and governmental
capacity. . . " 3 DILLON, supra note 9, § 1188, at 1887.
15. McPhee v. Dade County, 362 So. 2d 74, 79-80 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)
(citation omitted).
16. See discussion infra Part I.C. Some early courts did not even protect land held
in a governmental capacity. See Evans v. Erie County, 66 Pa. 222, 228 (1870) ("That the
Statute of Limitations runs against a county or other municipal corporation, we think
cannot be doubted. The prerogative is that of the sovereign alone: Nullum tempus oc-
currit reipublicae.').
17. See Williams v. City of Longmont, 129 P2d 110, 111-12 (Colo. 1942); Woodford
v. City of St. Petersburg, 84 So. 2d 25, 26 (Fla. 1955); Augustine v. Town of Brant, 163
N.E. 732, 733-34 (N.Y 1928).
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The difference between governmental and proprietary activi-
ties has never been defined satisfactorily.8 One court has
suggested:
[I]n truth there is no universally accepted or all-inclusive
test to determine whether a given act of a municipality is
private or governmental in its nature, but the question is
usually determined by the public policy recognized in the
jurisdiction where it arises.... Where the act in question
is sanctioned by legislative authority, is solely for the pub-
lic benefit, with no profit or emolument inuring to the
municipality, and tends to benefit the public health and
promote the welfare of the whole public, and has in it no
element of private interest, it is governmental in its na-
ture.'9
Even this "test," however, is not particularly helpful in
determining what is a purely governmental function, as
opposed to one contaminated with "local or special interests of
the municipality."20 Using this "test," Maryland courts have
repeatedly held that the maintenance of streets and sidewalks
is a matter of local interest to the municipality, and thus
18. See Austin v. Mayor of Baltimore, 405 A.2d 255, 272 (Md. 1979) (Cole, J., dis-
senting).
19. Mayor of Baltimore v. State ex rel. Blueford, 195 A. 571, 576 (Md. 1937)
(holding a municipality immune from suit for negligence in the operation of a public
pool). The Blueford Court claimed that:
[Ilt is better that the adequate performance of such an act be secured by public
prosecution and punishment of officials who violate the duties imposed upon
them in respect to it than to disburse public funds dedicated to the maintenance
of such public conveniences as public parks, playgrounds, hospitals, swimming
pools, and beaches maintained at the public expense to private persons who have
suffered loss through the negligence or default of municipal employees or agents
charged with their management.
Id.; see also E. Eyring & Sons Co. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 252 A-2d 824, 825-26 (Md.
1969) (finding issuance of building permits as well as supervision and inspection of
church construction to be governmental acts for the performance of which the city is
immune from suit according to the standards established in Blueford).
20. Mayor of Baltimore v. Eagers, 173 A. 56, 59 (Md. 1934) ("It is often difficult to
determine in a particular instance whether the duty involved is in the exercise or ne-
glect of the municipality's governmental or political functions or of its ministerial and
private or corporate functions. The decisions do not furnish a satisfactory test, as they
are conflicting in their reasoning and conclusions.").
479
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proprietary in nature, subjecting the municipality to liability
for the negligence of its agents.21
The uncertainty arising from use of the governmental/
proprietary distinction in determining municipal liability for
the negligent actions of municipal agents has led to wildly
inconsistent results, even between courts within the same
state.22  For example, Florida courts have held that a
municipality could be held liable for the negligent operation of
a fire truck,2 but not for an intentional assault by a police
officer during the course of an arrest.2' Similarly, the courts of
Maryland have held the operation of a park and municipal
swimming pool to be governmental and thus immune from suit
for negligence,' and yet have classified maintenance of public
21. See id. at 59-60; Mayor of Hagerstown v. Crowl, 97 A. 544, 546 (Md. 1916)
(holding city liable for negligence where it issued a building permit for construction of
an addition to a building without requiring safeguards to protect nearby pedestrians,
and a person was injured by a falling brick); Mayor of Havre de Grace v. Fletcher, 77 A.
114, 117 (Md. 1910) (holding a city liable for failing to stop a business from stacking
beer kegs dangerously high on a public sidewalk).
22. "Not only are the cases in hopeless confusion as between jurisdictions, but
even within a particular state they often turn on incomprehensible abstrusities." 2
STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 6:9, at 49 (1985).
Likewise, Professor Davis concludes: "The distinction is probably one of the most un-
satisfactory known to the law, for it has caused confusion not only among the various
jurisdictions but almost always within each jurisdiction." 3 KENNETH CULP DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 25.07, at 460 (1958).
23. See City of Tallahassee v. Kaufman, 100 So. 150, 152 (Fla. 1924) (holding that
city charter giving city "power... to provide for and maintain a fire department" was
"not a command to provide and maintain a fire department and fire-fighting apparatus
as a purely governmental function, but.., a grant of power to be exercised for the bene-
fit of the municipality and its inhabitants"); Maxwell v. City of Miami, 100 So. 147, 149
(Fla. 1924). The court stated:
Reckless driving of fire trucks on the streets of a city is manifestly not essential
to efficiency in fire fighting, and such conduct needlessly and unreasonably and
consequently unlawfully impairs the private rights of those who are lawfully
upon the streets with their property Such conduct renders the streets unsafe,
and, when permitted by the city, liability of the city may arise therefrom if per-
sons and property lawfully on the streets are injured in consequence thereof
Id.
24. See Brown v. Town of Eustis, 110 So. 873, 873-74 (Fla. 1926) (holding that an
officer's unlawful actions were unauthorized by the city and thus not an exercise of the
city's corporate power); see also Kennedy v. City of Daytona Beach, 182 So. 228, 229 (Fla.
1938) (asserting that a police force serves the public's interests, not the city's corporate
interests); Woodford v. City of St. Petersburg, 84 So. 2d 25, 27 (Fla. 1955) (holding that
the city's liability for negligent failure to prevent injury arising from spectators' actions
at public ballpark depended upon the city's role in the effective abatement of the nui-
sance).
25. See Mayor of Baltimore v. State ex rel. Blueford, 195 A. 571, 575 (Md. 1937)
(holding that operation of municipal swimming pool was a governmental function);
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highways as proprietary, subjecting the municipality to liability
for the negligence of its agents in that context." Conspicuously
absent is any overriding rationale that would justify a rule that
holds a municipality to be more "governmental" while running
a swimming pool than while maintaining city streets.
Nor have the cases been consistent between states. In Cali-
fornia, Connecticut, Maryland, Ohio, and Utah, for example, the
operation of a public park, swimming pool, or other recreation
area is considered governmental, such -that municipalities in
those states are not liable in tort for their agents' negligence.28
In Colorado, Florida, New York, and Virginia, however, the op-
eration of a park, swimming pool, or recreation area has been
deemed proprietary, and municipalities in those states may be
liable in tort for their agents' negligence. 9
Mayor of Baltimore v. State ex rel. Ahrens, 179 A. 169, 173 (Md. 1935) (holding that
maintenance of municipal park with bathing stream running through it was a govern-
mental function).
26. See Mayor of Baltimore v. Eagers, 173 A. 56, 60 (Md. 1934) (negligent removal
of a tree near a public square by municipal workers constituted a proprietary function
and city was thus liable); Cox v. Board of Comm'rs, 31 A.2d 179, 181 (Md. 1943) (noting
the Maryland rule that a city exercises a proprietary function when it maintains public
highways and, therefore, is liable for its negligence).
27. It is difficult to find a good reason for holding that a municipality (using the
word broadly) is not exercising the police power for the safety of the public when it is
maintaining public highways. However, the rule in this state and in other jurisdictions
is that the municipality is acting in its corporate capacity, and is liable for its negli-
gence. See Cox, 31 A.2d at 181.
28. See Crone v. City of El Cajon, 24 P.2d 846, 848 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1933)
(operation of a swimming pool in a public park is a governmental function); Hannon v.
City of Waterbury, 136 A. 876, 877 (Conn. 1927) ("Public parks, playgrounds, swimming
pools, and public baths or bathing houses are all examples of municipal functions un-
dertaken for the public benefit, and, unless maintained for the corporate profit of the
municipality are within the rule of governmental immunity."); Ahrens, 179 A. at 173
("maintenance, control, and operation" of a municipal park with an allegedly dangerous
bathing stream was a governmental function); Blueford, 195 A. at 575 (operation of a
public swimming pool was a governmental function); Selden v. City of Cuyahoga Falls, 6
N.E.2d 976, 977 (Ohio 1937) ("To simplify and shorten this discussion, it should be
noted that the defendant municipality here acted in a governmental rather than a pro-
prietary capacity in the construction and maintenance of its park with a swimming pool
for the use and benefit of the general public."); Alder v. Salt Lake City, 231 P. 1102, 1103
(Utah 1924) ("While there are some cases to the contrary, the great weight of judicial
opinion is that the maintenance of parks and playgrounds is a public and governmental
function.").
29. See Williams v. City of Longmont, 129 P.2d 110 (Colo. 1942) (distinguishing the
proprietary role of operating a public park from the governmental role of preserving
order in that park); City of Denver v. Spencer, 82 P. 590, 590-92 (Colo. 1905) (public
park); Pickett v. City of Jacksonville, 20 So. 2d 484, 486 (Fla. 1945) (swimming pool);
Augustine v. Town of Brant, 163 N.E. 732, 734 (N.Y 1928) ("The modern tendency is
against the rule of nonliability... A wise public policy forbids us to recognize the town
of Brant as acting as a sovereign when it maintains its park. It acts as a legal individ-
ual voluntarily assuming a duty, not imposed upon it, for the benefit of a locality rather
482 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
This distinction between governmental and proprietary func-
tions as it relates to immunity from tort liability has come
under blistering attack.30 Critics point out that the distinction
fails to provide a framework for analyzing a new set of facts
3
'
and thus fails to provide courts with necessary guidance. Many
states have chosen to abandon the distinction between govern-
mental and proprietary functions, and have chosen instead to
render municipalities uniformly liable for the tortious actions of
all of their agents.32 Courts and commentators have grown less
than the general public." (citation omitted)); Hoggard v. City of Richmond, 200 S.E. 610,
611 (Va. 1939) (swimming pool); see also 3 DAVIS, supra note 22, § 25.07, at 460-63
(analyzing Hoggard).
30. After describing the "unsubstantial nature of the reasons for the
governmental-private distinction," one commentator noted:
All this would be bad enough if the test were simple and easy to determine. But
no satisfactory basis for solving the problem whether the activity falls into one
class or other has been evolved. The rules sought to be established [in determin-
ing whether a given function is governmental or proprietary] are as logical as
those governing French irregular verbs.
Murray Seasongood, Municipal Corporations: Objections to the Governmental or Pro-
prietary Test, 22 VA. L. REV. 910 (1936), reprinted in 53 U CIN. L. REV. 469, 493 (1984);
see also Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, 132-33 (Fla. 1957) (holding
municipal corporation liable for the torts of police officers under the doctrine of respon-
deat superior and rejecting governmental/proprietary distinction as the basis for its
decision); Austin v. City of Baltimore, 405 A.2d 255, 269 (Md. 1979) (Cole, J., dissenting)
("The majority... continues to perpetuate the gross inequity inherent in the doctrine of
governmental immunity...."); John A. Gleason & Kenneth VanWinkle, Jr., Comment,
The Ohio Political Subdivision 7brt Liability Act: A Legislative Response to the Judicial
Abolishment of Sovereign Immunity, 55 U CIN. L. REV. 501, 506 (1986) ("The continued
application of the governmental-proprietary distinction resulted in inconsistent deci-
sions and often led to absurd and unjust consequences.").
31. One critic has argued:
These criteria are elusive and unsatisfactory. All the functions of a municipality
are-or should be-for the public benefit. They are none the less so because they
serve directly and primarily only a limited segment of the public rather than all
the people of the state. To the extent that cities are instrumentalities of the state,
their main function is to serve the state's purposes locally The fact that the mu-
nicipality makes a charge or a profit in connection with the service rendered has
often been considered; but functions have been held governmental in spite of a
charge, and functions have been held proprietary where there is neither charge
nor profit. The historical test is a suggestive guide though a faltering one. Many
of the functions now generally considered governmental were privately per-
formed in the not very distant past. Little wonder that courts and commentators
have despaired of finding a rational and consistent key to the distinction....
2 FOWLER W. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 29.6, at 628-29 (2d ed. 1986).
32. See Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, 132-34 (Fla. 1957). The
court stated:
[VOL. 31:2
WINTER 1998] Adverse Possession of Municipal Land
and less comfortable with both municipal immunity from tort
claims and the governmental/proprietary test supporting that
immunity.3
It makes sense to abolish a distinction that is impossible to
apply consistently and fairly, and that is unsupported by any
well-articulated rationale.3' This is true for claims of adverse
possession as well as for tort claims. In the tort context, the
governmental/proprietary distinction should be replaced by a
rule of uniform liability for municipalities. However, as dis-
cussed in the next Part, abolition of this distinction in the
adverse possession context should result in more, rather than
less, protection for municipalities.
C. The Governmental/Proprietary Distinction
in Adverse Possession Cases
1. There Are Many Reasons to Protect Municipal Land Held
in a Governmental Capacity-Land owned by a municipality
that is used in connection with the municipality's governmental
powers, or which has been dedicated to a public purpose, has
almost always been deemed immune from adverse possession.
Courts have offered a number of justifications to support such
immunity. First, in some states, land dedicated to a public use
The problem in Florida has become more confusing because of an effort to prune
and pare the rule of immunity rather than to uproot it bodily and lay it aside as
we should any other archaic and outmoded concept. This pruning approach has
produced numerous strange and incongruous results.... [Wihen an individual
suffers a direct, personal injury proximately caused by the negligence of a mu-
nicipal employee while acting within the scope of his employment, the injured
individual is entitled to redress for the wrong done.
Id.
33. See SPEISER, supra note 22, § 6.9, at 51-52 & n.2; see also McAndrew v. Mular-
chuk, 162 A.2d 820, 830-32 (N.J. 1960) (holding that municipal tort liability should be
assessed based on respondeat superior analysis and not according to the governmen-
tal/proprietary distinction).
34. One of the few positive comments regarding this distinction in tort law comes
from Professor Davis. "To the extent that the governmental-proprietary distinction pro-
duces municipal responsibility that might not otherwise exist, the distinction makes for
justice, for liability for some municipal torts is to be preferred to liability for no munici-
pal torts." 3 DAVIS, supra note 22, § 25.07, at 459. It is clear from his comment, however,
that even Professor Davis would support the abolition of the distinction in favor of a
rule providing consistent municipal liability for torts.
483
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or trust is inalienable.35 This being the case, title to such land
cannot be taken by adverse possession." Second, other state
courts have held simply that land subject to a public trust may
not be acquired by adverse possession, without regard to
whether the land is alienable. 7 Third, courts have also held
that unauthorized obstructions and erections upon public lands
constitute nuisances, and that no amount of time can serve to
legalize a nuisance.38 A fourth theory posits that encroachments
upon public property are a matter of sufferance until such time
as the property is needed for its designated purpose, and are
35. See Montgomery County v. Maryland-Washington Metro. Dist., 96 A.2d 353,
357 (Md. 1953) ("Property which is held in a governmental capacity or is impressed
with a public trust, cannot be disposed of without special statutory authority."). One
scholar offered the following explanation:
Public policy is the real underlying reason why such alienation is not permitted.
It is felt that it is unwise for any particular administration to have power to sell
all the property of the corporation. Too many opportunities for graft or political
machinations would be presented if the municipality could alienate at pleasure,
with the consequent result that the future welfare of such governmental agency
would be a matter of doubt.
Delmar W. Doddridge, Distinction Between Governmental and Proprietary Functions of
Municipal Corporations, 23 MICH. L. REV. 325, 332 (1925).
36. See West Ctr. Congregational Church v. Efstathiou, 627 N.YS.2d 727, 728
(App. Div. 1995); Messersmith v. Mayor of Riverdale, 164 A.2d 523, 525 (Md. 1960) ("In
Illinois,... it is held that this statute [of limitations] does not apply to a suit brought by
a municipal corporation to recover possession of property which was dedicated to it for
the use of the public, since the corporation has no power to alien or dispose of the prop-
erty, and hence there could be no paper title to be protected such as the statute
contemplated."); 3 DILLON, supra note 9, § 1191, at 1892; see also BYRON K ELLIO'T &
WILLIAM F. ELLIOTT, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF ROADS & STREETS § 883, at 968-69
(2d ed. 1900).
Municipal corporations have no power to alien or dispose of their streets for any
purpose inconsistent with their use as highways. It would be a grave reproach to
the law to permit a wrongdoer, one who is daily violating the law of the state it-
self, to take advantage of his own wrong and that of the municipality, and by such
indirect and wrongful means obtain a right to the street which the corporation is
prohibited from directly granting or destroying.
Id.
37. See Thurston v. City of Forest Park, 89 S.E.2d 509, 511 (Ga. 1955); Town of
Chouteau v. Blankenship, 152 P.2d 379,383 (Okla. 1944).
38. See ELLIOTT & ELLIO'rr, supra note 36, § 883, at 968 ("There can be no rightful
permanent private possession of a public street. Its obstruction is a nuisance, punish-
able by indictment. Each day's continuance thereof is an indictable offense, and it
follows, therefore, that no right to maintain it can be acquired by prescription."); Hed-
dleston v. Hendricks, 40 N.E. 408, 410 (Ohio 1895); 3 DILLON, supra note 9, § 1189, at
1889.
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not, therefore, adverse to the right of the public entity.9 A final
justification recognizes the reality of municipal operations:
Individuals may reasonably be held to a limited period to
enforce their rights against adverse occupants, because
they have an interest sufficient to make them vigilant. But
in public right of property, each individual feels but a
slight interest, and rather tolerates even a manifest en-
croachment, than seeks a dispute to set it right.40
Whatever the justification, many states have adopted
statutes expressly protecting land dedicated to a public use
from adverse possession.41 Many courts in states without such
statutory guidance have also drawn the public/private,
governmental/proprietary distinction in holding that land
dedicated to a public use is immune from adverse possession.42
The only issue in such cases is whether the particular purpose
for which the land is held is sufficiently "public" to merit
immunity. As demonstrated in the next section, however, courts
have not been consistent in making this determination.
2. There Are Few, if Any, Reasons Not to Protect Municipal
Land Held in a Proprietary Capacity-It is reasonable to expect
that all land owned by a municipality would be protected from
adverse possession. Regardless of the use to which the land is
put, or the manner in which it was acquired, it is an asset of the
local government. The value of that land inures to the benefit of
the citizens of the community regardless of whether it is dedi-
cated to a public use or is maintained as an open parcel for
39. See McClelland v. Miller, 28 Ohio St. 488, 502 (1876). The McClelland court
stated:
[The mere inclosing of a part of a highway by a fence, does not necessarily con-
stitute such adverse possession, as against the public, as will confer title by mere
lapse of time. When roads are laid out and travel is limited, necessity may not
require that the whole width should be opened when a less quantity answers
every purpose. But the fact that a portion of the highway remains in the posses-
sion of adjoining owners, is merely matter of sufferance, from which rights can
not accrue.
l
40. Commonwealth v. Alburger, 1 Whart. 469,488 (Pa. 1836).
41. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-509 (1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 516.090 (West 1952);
TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.030 (West 1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 462
(1973). These states are discussed infra in Part II.A
42. See Henry Cowell Lime & Cement Co. v. State, 114 P.2d 331, 332-33 (Cal.
1941); Siejack v. Mayor of Baltimore, 313 A-2d 843,846 (Md. 1974).
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potential future development. 3 Even if it is never developed
and used for municipal purposes, the land may be sold and the
profits may be applied to any number of municipal needs (such
as increasing the size of the police force, constructing a new city
hall, or maintaining roads and sewers). In other words, the cur-
rent use of the land is irrelevant to its importance as a
municipal asset capable of being converted to funds for impor-
tant municipal projects in relatively short order.
Nonetheless, while the justifications discussed in Part I.C.1
drive courts to protect municipally owned land from adverse
possession where that land has been dedicated to a public
purpose, very often municipally owned land held in a private or
proprietary capacity is deemed unprotected.4 No coherent
explanation for permitting the loss of a valuable municipal
asset to adverse possession has been articulated. In his early
treatise on the law of municipal corporations, Professor Dillon
remarked: "As respects property not held for public use, or upon
public trust, and as respects contracts and rights of a private
nature, there is no reason why such corporations should not fall
within limitation statutes, and be affected by them unless
excluded from them."5 This designation as "private" of lands
devoted to certain municipal functions renders municipal
owners subject to all statutes of limitation applicable to private
entities."' The fact that these private functions often support
governmental ones has been overlooked.
43. For example, Foster City, California bought land in a foreclosure sale which it
sold five years later for $24.5 million, over twice the amount of its investment. The city
apparently had no immediate plans to develop the property when it was acquired. The
city council made the purchase "in a down market" to protect part of the city's redevel-
opment assessment district. See Mark Simon, Lucrative Payoff for Foster City: It Should
Double Money on 35-Acre View Parcel, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 1, 1996, at A15. Holding such
property would not meet most traditional tests for "public use," but the value inured to
the benefit of the community without such a dedication.
44. See Siejack, 313 A.2d at 846; see also Henry Cowell Lime & Cement Co., 114
P.2d at 332; Goldman v. Quadrato, 114 A.2d 687, 690 (Conn. 1955).
45. 3 DILLON, supra note 9, § 1194, at 1900.
46. See id. § 1188, at 1187-88. Professor Dillon observed the following-
Although municipal corporations are public agencies, exercising, on behalf of the
State, public duties, yet they also exercise and acquire what the courts have
called rights in a private and proprietary capacity rather than in a public and
governmental capacity, and such corporations are not exempt from the operation
of limitation statutes in cases wherein arise questions involving property or con-
tracts which do not pertain to the authority of the State which is exercised
through them, but pertain to the private and contractual rights of the municipal-
ity, and such statutes run in favor of and against these corporations with respect
to these private and proprietary rights and obligations in the same manner and
to the same extent as against natural persons.
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Similarly, Rhyne's treatise on municipal law states, without
analysis or comment:
Title to land affected by the public interest or dedicated to
a public use generally cannot be acquired by adverse pos-
session or prescription against a municipal corporation or
other local government unit, although a few courts have
held to the contrary ... On the other hand, it has been
held that property held by a municipality in its private or
proprietary capacity may be lost by adverse possession."
McQuillin, in an earlier edition of his treatise, said flatly that
"title to property of the municipality not devoted to a public use
can be ... acquired in all jurisdictions [by adverse posses-
sion]."' As will be shown, this assertion overstates the law on
this issue.
The absence of analysis in the treatises regarding the vul-
nerability of proprietary municipal land may reflect the lack of
any such analysis on the part of courts making the decisions
referenced in the treatises. An important recent case which
does engage in such an analysis is Devins v. Borough of Bo-
gota,49 in which the New Jersey Supreme Court set out a series
of reasons for subjecting proprietary municipal land to adverse
possession. 0 In addition to the traditional justifications for ad-
verse possession,"1 the court suggested that subjecting
municipal land held in a non-governmental capacity to adverse
possession is appropriate because: New Jersey law no longer
grants the state sovereign immunity from suit in tort and con-
tract cases;52 such a rule is not an "undue burden on
municipalities;"53 and the court was "reluctant to adopt a policy
3 Id.
47. RHYNE, supra note 11, § 16-13, at 383.
48. 10 EUGENE McQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 28.55, at
143 (3d ed. 1950). In the latest edition, the authors have qualified their statement:
"Although there is some authority to the contrary, title to property of the municipality
not devoted to a public use can be acquired by adverse possession." 10 EUGENE
McQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 28.55, at 225 (3d ed. rev. 1990).
49. 592 A.2d 199 (N.J. 1991).
50. See id. at 202-03.
51. The court cited the following considerations: "First, statutes of limitation allow
repose and avoid adjudications based on stale evidence. Second, adverse possession
promotes certainty of title, and protects the possessor's reasonable expectations. Third,
allowing adverse possession promotes active and efficient use of land, and 'tends to
serve the public interest by stimulating the expeditious assertion of public claims.'" Id.
at 202 (citations omitted).
52. See id. at 202.
53. Id. at 203.
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that would encourage municipalities not to use, -dedicate, or
even identify their property."54 The plaintiff in Devins offered
yet another justification: that adverse possession "would en-
courage municipal efficiency and the return of property to the
tax rolls."55
When examined closely, however, none of these reasons is
particularly compelling. The fact that New Jersey now permits
itself and its subdivisions to be sued for the wrongful acts of
their agents does not support the notion that municipalities
should lose their land due to the oversight, mistake, or fraud of
their agents. Holding a municipality accountable for its agents'
wrongful acts where innocent parties have been injured is quite
different from giving away municipal land simply because local
government agents failed to oust a trespasser in a timely
56
manner.
The Devins court was also wrong in suggesting that it is not
difficult for municipalities to keep track of and protect their
land. That may be true of small towns, but recent reports dem-
onstrate that many cities now own large numbers of parcels
that they have taken for nonpayment of taxes.57 As discussed
below, the problem of identifying and protecting tax-reverted
parcels is a large one, and not one to be discounted lightly. In
adopting a rule that would penalize municipalities for not using
or dedicating (by use or plans for use) their property, the Devins
court took a position rejected by many modern courts. As dis-
cussed in the next section, the trend has been to recognize that
merely holding title to land without any actual use or plans can
and should constitute a valuable public function.
Finally, one can hardly agree with the Devins plaintiff that
somehow the public wins where government land is transferred
into private hands with no consideration. If enlarging the tax
rolls is deemed necessary in any given city, presumably the
governing body can choose to sell off some public land for full
fair market value, thus enhancing public funds through both
54. Id. at 203.
55. Id. at 202.
56. See supra Part I.B.
57. See Editorial, Gold, Perhaps, In the Land: LA Should Explore Selling Some
Municipally Owned Parcels, L-- TIMES, July 16, 1996, at B6 (stating that in July 1996,
Los Angeles had 7,6.02 municipally owned parcels of land and commenting that "[it's
laughable that the city has just two real estate experts and a few clerks for the task" of
identifying appropriate parcels for sale); see also infra Part III.
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the sales price and the taxes." That body, and not the courts,
should determine how municipal land is to be used. Further-
more, simply transferring the land to the tax rolls through
adverse possession ignores the loss to the municipality of the
value of the land itself. The potential value of such land is dem-
onstrated by a 1996 proposal to sell approximately 300
properties in Los Angeles; the sale was expected to bring in $30
million for the municipality.59 Allowing the local government to
make decisions about land sales also encourages municipal in-
novation and creativity. For example, in late 1996, the tiny
Texas Panhandle town of Lefors held a raffle for fourteen city
lots taken for non-payment of taxes, in attempt to bring in new
families to help support the local schools and increase economic
development.6
The Devins court is not alone in overlooking the difficulty of
keeping track of municipally owned land. One author has sug-
gested that statutes of limitation should apply to municipally
owned land because "government lawyers exercising ordinary
care ought to be able to file suits on time; after all, most of
Maryland's statutes of limitations are measured in years, not
months."6' The problem, however, is not with timely preparation
of the pleadings. In many cities the difficulty lies in identifying
all municipally owned parcels and monitoring those parcels to
determine whether or not someone is encroaching.
The Devins case is discussed in a number of articles, most of
which support the court's analysis. 2 One author said:
58. In 1996, the city of Newark auctioned 90 publicly owned parcels, most of which
had been seized by the city for nonpayment of taxes. See George E. Jordan, Long Lines
at City Hall as Tax Time Comes Again, THE STAR-LEDGER, Oct. 11, 1996, at 33.
59. See Hugo Martin, LA Plans to Beef Up Coffers with Land Sales L.A. TIMES,
July 15, 1996, at Al. A 1995 auction of 19 properties brought in nearly $10 million for
Orange County. See Editorial, supra note 57, at B6.
60. See Allen Turner, New Owners Get Lots of Incentive: Houston Cook Among 14
Winners in Land Giveaway, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 16, 1996, at 1. Many of those lots had
reverted to the city after a 1975 tornado. See Erin Allday, Sacrificial Land: A Small
Town Gives Parts of Itself away to Keep Its School, WALL ST. J. (Texas Journal), July 31,
1996, at 4. If those lots had been lost to adverse possessors during the 21 years the city
held them, this option would not have been available.
61. Thomas A. Bowden, Sovereign Immunity from Statutes of Limitation in Mary-
land, 46 MD. L. REV. 408,429 (1987).
62. See Carl C. Risch, Note, Encouraging the Responsible Use of Land by Munici-
palities: The Erosion of Nullum Tempus Occurrit Regi and the Use of Adverse Possession
Against Municipal Land Owners, 99 DIcK. L. REv. 197, 215 (1994) (adopting the "goals"
of adverse possession statutes of limitations as set forth in Devins); Mary B. Edwards,
Recent Development, 22 SETON HALL L. REv. 262, 265 (1991) (endorsing the new Devins
rule). But see Denise Vicente Tighe, Comment, Devins v. Borough of Bogota: Municipal
Property for Sale or Theft, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 197, 216-25 (1992) (criticizing the Dev-
ins decision and arguing that the court should have deferred to legislative solutions).
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The Devins court correctly focused on the spirit of the ad-
verse possession laws because upholding the nullum
tempus doctrine would have encouraged land waste. The
Borough allowed the Lot to remain vacant for over twenty
years while the plaintiffs, who employed the land for their
use and enjoyment, were rightly rewarded for that use.63
This comment assumes, with no factual support from the re-
port of the case, that it is somehow nobler or better to use land,
without regard to the type of use, than it is to leave it vacant.
Hence, the suggestion that the plaintiffs should be "rewarded
for their use.' While this was once the predominant American
philosophy toward land use,5 such bias in favor of universal
aggressive land development has come under serious attack.66 It
is no longer persuasive to simply argue that use, without regard
63. Edwards, supra note 62, at 265.
64. This pro-development bias likewise motivates the pro-Devins analysis in
Risch, supra note 62. The author laments the ways in which nullum tempus frustrates
the goals of adverse possession. See Risch, supra note 62, at 213-19. Of course, it is the
premise of this Article that adverse possession frustrates the reasonable operation of
municipal government.
65. See RALEIGH BARLOWE, LAND RESOURCE ECONOMICS: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF RURAL AND URBAN LAND RESOURCE USE 284 (1958):
The idea of preserving land resources intact for future use has never gained
much popular acceptance. To be sure, many conservationists stress the need for
saving certain resources for future use; and some have probably overemphasized
this point. But most people react negatively to a policy of nonuse. They favor the
maintenance and saving of land resources, but only to the extent to which con-
servation policies can be made consistent with a program of effective current use.
Id.; see also Stephen S. Visher, The Public Domain, in CONSERVATION OF NATIONAL
RESOURCES 15, 19 (Guy-Harold Smith ed., 3d ed. 1965) ("Wild land was long considered
to have little value. ... Similarly, trees were long inadequately appreciated. The man
who cleared the most land was the popular hero, and he who did not completely clear
his land was called lazy. The statement, made by those less blind than their fellows,
that there would soon be a timber shortage was widely ridiculed.").
66. See, e-g., John G. Sprankling, An Environmental Critique of Adverse Pbssession,
79 CORNELL L. REV. 816 (1994) (arguing that the pro-development model of adverse
possession "is fundamentally antagonistic to the twentieth century concern for preser-
vation"); Latovick, supra note 5, at 944-45 (arguing that all state land, especially
undeveloped land, should be immune from adverse possession to reduce incentives for
private development); Comment, Compensation for the Involuntary Transfer of Property
Between Private Parties: Application of a Liability Rule to the Law of Adverse Pbssession,
79 Nw. U. L. REV. 758, 761 (1984) (arguing that the traditional justification for adverse
possession-that it enhances economic efficiency-is invalid because "preservation of
undeveloped land is a productive 'use' that does not entail exploitation of the land it-
self"); see also Aldo Leopold, The Land Ethic, in PEOPLE, PENGUINS, AND PLASTIC TREES
73-82 (Donald VanDeVeer & Christine Pierce eds., 1986).
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to its type or intensity, is always preferable to non-uise. One
might also ask whether the Devins plaintiffs had not already
been sufficiently rewarded for their use by having twenty years
rent-free enjoyment of land they did not own. It is not at all
clear why they should also receive the title to the land at the
expense of the local community."8
Furthermore, it is unfair to characterize the situation in
Devins as an incidence of "land waste." In fact, the lack of use in
Devins does not come close to the concept of "legal waste" as the
courts have defined it. 'Waste occurs when the owner of a
possessory estate engages in unreasonable conduct that results
in physical damage to the land and substantial diminution in
the value of estates owned by others in the same land."69 In
Devins, as in the typical adverse possession context, the
municipality's "waste" involved permitting the land to sit idle
for a period of time, during which time the claimant made use
of the land. There was no suggestion that the city's lack of use
in Devins in some way caused physical damage to the
property 0 In addition, in Devins, as in the typical setting, the
municipality owned the land in fee simple, and there were no
other parties owning an interest in the land. 1 Simply leaving
land vacant and unused, as any landowner has a right to do, is
not "waste" according to the legal definition of that term. Nor is
67. See American Trading Real Estate Properties, Inc. v. Town of Trumbull, 574
A-2d 796, 802 (Conn. 1990). The court noted:
A municipality might, for example, elect to buffer a park from encroaching devel-
opment by maintaining undeveloped property adjacent to the park. Similarly, a
municipality might attempt to preserve the character of the community by ac-
quiring 'open space' land or 'greenbelts' or might seek to protect wildlife or inland
wetlands by purchasing land to be left in an undisturbed state.
Id.
68. See State v. Simpson, 397 P.2d 288, 292 (Alaska 1964) (declining to permit ad-
verse possession of a city street even though the claimant and his predecessors had paid
taxes on the land for almost 30 years). The court reasoned: "It is true that appellee and
his predecessors ... have paid taxes on the disputed area since 1936. On the other
hand, they have had the rent free use of some 761 square feet of business property for
the same period of years." Id.
69. McKibben v. Mohawk Oil Co., 667 P.2d 1223, 1228 (Alaska 1983).
70. In fact, the court's only reference to the city's use of the land was that "the lot
was permitted to remain vacant and unused by the Borough." 568 A.2d at 904.
71. Id. ("In November of 1962, the Borough had acquired title to that vacant prop-
erty through an in rem foreclosure of a tax sale certificate. . .).
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it still acceptable to suggest that just letting land sit idle is a
waste of a valuable resource.72
3. The Difficulty in Determining What is a Sufficiently
"Public" Use to Justify Protection-Many states have
incorporated into their laws, by statute, the public/private
distinction regarding the adverse possession of municipally
owned land. They have done so using a variety of formulations
involving the word "public." A number of states exempt any
"public ground" from adverse possession.73 Others protect land
dedicated or appropriated to a "public use,"74 or a "public
purpose."75 A few others extend this protection to land dedicated
to a "public, pious or charitable use."76
In states whose statutes are silent on the subject, courts have
held that municipal land not held in a governmental capacity,
i.e., land not dedicated to some public use or purpose, is subject
to adverse possession.77 The key issue that arises in all of these
states, then, is what constitutes a public use or purpose?
One category of municipal land often deemed not to be dedi-
cated to a public purpose is land that was once open and
undeveloped (before the claimant began using it) and for which
the municipality had no expressed or immediate plans.78 For
72. See generally Sprankling, supra note 66, at 816 (such an argument embraces "a
prodevelopment nineteenth century ideology that encourages and legitimates economic
exploitation ... of wild lands").
73. See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.5821(2) (West 1987) (protecting "any ...
public ground"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-202(1) (1995) (protecting "public or political sub-
division grounds"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 477-34 (1992) (protecting "any ... public
ground"); OR. REV. STAT. § 221.750 (1995) (protecting "public places").
74. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-509 (1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.01 (West 1988);
TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.030 (West 1986).
75. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/13-111 (West 1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 15-3-17 (Michie 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-13 (1996); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 7.28.090 (West 1992).
76. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 516.090 (West 1952); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 462 (1973).
77. The courts have used the terminology "not held for a public use or purpose"
and "held in a proprietary capacity" interchangeably. See, e-g., Montgomery County v.
Maryland-Washington Metro. Dist., 96 A.2d 353,357 (Md. 1953). The court noted:
[L]and bought for a public use, if not actually so used, cannot be said to be af-
fected by a public trust, and hence may be sold without special legislative
authority... Property which is held in a governmental capacity or is impressed
with a public trust, cannot be disposed of without special statutory authority. But
as to property held in a proprietary capacity and not dedicated to public use, or
impressed with a trust, the rule is otherwise.
Id. (citations omitted).
78. A lack of governmental intent to use land solely for public or governmental
purposes is significant for a finding of adverse possession of municipal land. See Brown
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example, land located near a parking lot which the plaintiff
paved and used,79 land acquired 125 years earlier for the pur-
pose of drilling water wells (which never was drilled or
otherwise developed),0 and filled land in a creek bed81 all have
been deemed susceptible to adverse possession because they
were not held for an identified public purpose. In a Maryland
case, the city of Baltimore had purchased a parcel of land pur-
suant to a law that required it to buy out existing water
company facilities in order to complete an annexation.82 The
city had no immediate use for the land and left it vacant.' The
claimant occupied the land for the statutory period, and the
court held that the city had lost the land through adverse pos-
session because it had not been dedicated to a public use.'
The Washington Court of Appeals has also adopted an
approach which seems to demand that municipal land held in a
governmental capacity must have an actual public use. In two
cases, the court has held that simply leaving land open and free
from development is done in a proprietary capacity. In one
case, the court permitted adverse possession of a county-owned
parcel of land located on a lake and next to the Olympic
National Park because it had not been dedicated "for use as a
v. Fisher, 193 S.W 357,362-63 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917); City of Tonawanda v. Ellicott Creek
Homeowners Ass'n, 449 N.Y.S.2d 116, 121-22 (App. Div. 1982).
79. See Lewis v. Village of Lyons, 389 N.Y.S.2d 674, 676 (App. Div. 1976)
(suggesting that because the city had previously sold other similar parcels to private
buyers, it had no public purpose in mind for the lot at issue); see also City of To-
nawanda, 449 N.YS.2d at 122 (in holding that the municipal land could be adversely
possessed, the court noted that the city had been "discussing the sale, public auction, or
leasing of the land with private citizens").
80. See Prothro v. Natchitoches, 265 So. 2d 242, 244-45 (La. Ct. App. 1972).
81. See Mileau Corp. v. City of New York, 421 N.Y.S.2d 258, 259-60 (App. Div.
1979).
82. See Siejack v. Mayor of Baltimore, 313 A.2d 843, 846-67 (Md. 1974).
83. See id. at 847.
84. See id. at 847. The court stated:
Quite likely nothing is more solidly established than the rule that title to prop-
erty held by a municipal corporation in its governmental capacity, for a public
use, cannot be acquired by adverse possession. Less frequently encountered,
however, although apparently as well established, is the notion that municipal
property not devoted to a public use can be so acquired. Until now we seem not to
have been required to consider whether it should be acknowledged to be the law
of Maryland. We think it is and we so hold .... (citations omitted)
Id. at 846.
85. See Kesinger v. Logan, 756 P.2d 752, 755 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988), aff'd, 779 P.2d
263 (Wash. 1989); Sisson v. Koelle, 520 P.2d 1380, 1383 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
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public right-of-way, or for any other public use."86 In the second
case, the court permitted adverse possession of a right-of-way
along a canal because "the property in question has never been
set apart or devoted to any use by the District."87 Clearly there
is no presumption in Washington that municipally owned land
is held for a public purpose.
Similarly, a New York trial court held that meadow and
marshland constituting "common lands" belonging to a town
had been lost by adverse possession, stating:
There is no proof that these commons were being reserved
for a governmental purpose. The proof is that the town has
never used or attempted to use them except to hold them.
In other words, the commons just laid idle for years upon
years. That is inconsistent with a holding for governmen-
tal purposes. If the town is to avail itself of the municipal
immunity from the prescription rule, I think it was re-
quired to adduce some proof that the locus in quo was
reserved for some governmental purpose. The town's fail-
ure to assert its title or to use the lands-both failures
continuing over centuries---establishes sufficiently that the
lands were not held for governmental purposes but were
held by the town in its proprietary capacity. As such, the
locus in quo was not free from the legal effects of adverse
88possession.
Contrary to these cases, in 1990, the supreme court of Con-
necticut recognized that merely holding land open and
undeveloped may involve a public use. 9 The trial court had
held that "something more, that is to say, actual public use,
must be shown."90 In rejecting an "actual public use" require-
ment, however, the Connecticut Supreme Court stated:
The trial court's narrow definition of the term public use
... excludes the possibility of uses that may be highly
86. Sisson, 520 P.2d at 1383. The trial court had found that the county had
"abandoned and forgotten about and had done nothing to sustain any title, or owner-
ship, or control, of the land in question." Id.
87. Kesinger, 756 P.2d at 755.
88. Long Island Land Research Bureau v. Town of Hempstead, 118 N.YS.2d 39, 46
(Sup. Ct. 1952), afftd, 126 N.YS.2d 857 (App. Div. 1954), aff'd, 125 N.E.2d 872 (N.Y
1955).
89. See American Trading Real Estate Properties, Inc. v. Town of Trumbull, 574
A.2d 796, 800-02 (Conn. 1990).
90. Id. at 801.
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beneficial to the public but that do not involve the type of
physical intrusion on the land that the "actual public use"
standard appears to contemplate. A municipality might...
elect to buffer a park from encroaching development by
maintaining undeveloped property adjacent to the park...
[or] might attempt to preserve the character of the com-
munity by acquiring "open space" land or "greenbelts" or
might seek to protect wildlife or inland wetlands by pur-
chasing land to be left in an undisturbed state. A standard
of public use that fails to include such uses would do a
great disservice to these commendable efforts to protect
the environment.... Moreover, the rationale underlying
the immunity of municipalities from adverse possession,
that the public should not lose its rights to property as a
result of the inattention of a governmental entity applies
with even greater force to situations involving undeveloped
lands, which may, by their nature, garner even less atten-
tion from local governments suffering from the constraints
of scarce fiscal resources.9'
The court adopted a more protective rule, holding that:
Land is indeed held for public use even when a municipal-
ity is not presently making use of the land but is simply
holding it for development at some later time. Absent some
evidence of municipal intention to abandon its plans for fu-
ture development of the municipal property, the land is
immune from claims of adverse possession.9
This rule places the burden on the would-be adverse posses-
sor to establish not only the usual elements of adverse
possession but also that the municipality has consciously aban-
doned its plans for the parcel. This rule also protects municipal
"uses" that might not have satisfied a more intrusive "actual
public use" standard.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court reached the same con-
clusion several years earlier.9 Certain shoreline lots were
leased to private tenants by a town for several years until a
large storm destroyed all of the buildings.' After that, the land
lay idle for some forty years, during which time the plaintiffs
91. Id. at 802 (citation omitted).
92. Id. at 802.
93. See McInnis v. Town of Hampton, 288 A-2d 691 (N.H. 1972).
94. See id. at 693.
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used it for recreational purposes and for access to the ocean.95 In
1970, the town again leased the lots to a private tenant, an ac-
tion the court described as being in the town's "'quasi private or
proprietary capacity.'"
Although it found that the town had acted in a proprietary
capacity when leasing the property, the court noted that the
town had not made proprietary use of the idle land during the
intervening years.
It was findable upon the evidence that the lots were held
by the town during the intervening period in a governmen-
tal capacity... It could properly be found that mere
retention of title, without more, was a public use and that
the land was held in a governmental capacity during the
period when the plaintiffs claimed to have acquired rights
by user.1
7
Applying novel reasoning, the court concluded that the town
had held the land in its governmental capacity for the forty
years the land lay idle, without finding that the land had been
dedicated to a public use." While most courts have assumed
that land held in a governmental capacity is necessarily dedi-
cated to the public use, the New Hampshire court treated these
two inquiries as independent issues-finding the one did not
necessitate finding the other.99 By divorcing the two issues, the
court was able to find that land held in a governmental capac-
ity constituted a "public ground" under the governing statute
and was, therefore, protected from adverse possession.1°°
Another category of open land which has sometimes been
subject to loss through adverse possession is land taken by a
city for nonpayment of real estate taxes. In those cases,
claimants have argued that land owned by a city pursuant to
its taxing authority is held in its proprietary capacity and is
95. See id
96. Id. at 693-94.
97. Id.
98. See id at 694. As an alternative to his adverse possession claim, the plaintiff
alleged that the land had been dedicated to public uses and could not be leased to a
private tenant. See id. at 692-94.
99. See id. at 693-94.
100. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 477:34 (1992) ("No person shall acquire by pre-
scription a right to any part of a town house, schoolhouse or church lot, or of any public
ground by fencing or otherwise inclosing the same or in any way occupying it adversely
for any length of time."). The Mclnnis court fully cited this provision. See McInnis, 288
A.2d at 693.
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therefore subject to adverse possession. In one oft-cited case,
Goldman v. Quadrato,°' the Connecticut Supreme Court agreed
with this argument, stating:
After title to lot 3 passed to the city of Waterbury by virtue
of a judgment foreclosing a tax lien, the lot was permitted
to lie idle. It was neither used for nor dedicated to any
public purpose. It remained, so to speak, legally fallow, a
vacant parcel of land in which the public were given no
beneficial rights, to be enjoyed presently or in the future.
The city was at liberty to sell or otherwise dispose of the
lot at pleasure. Under these circumstances, the lot was not
devoted to a public use."°
In so holding, the court rejected the argument that because tax
collection is a governmental function, holding land pursuant to
that function is also governmental. The court insisted that "the
controlling factor is the use to which the realty was put after its
acquisition.""o3
In 1991, the Vermont Supreme Court was faced with a claim
of adverse possession as to land a town had received in ex-
change for welfare support."° The town never utilized the
parcel, and after fifty-one years the town sold it on a quit claim
deed.0 5 Rejecting the town's argument that all land held by a
municipality is held in its governmental capacity,"° the court
instead chose what it termed a "balanced approach.""° Citing
101. 114 A.2d 687 (Conn. 1955).
102. Id. at 690.
103. Id. But see American Trading Real Estate Properties, Inc. v. Town of Trumbull,
574 A.2d 796i 801-02 (Conn. 1990) (limiting Goldman to its facts and reasoning that
"the public use requirement can be satisfied even if a property is not presently subject
to public use so long as it is held with an intention to develop it at some time in the
future").
104. See Jarvis v. Gillespie, 587 A.2d 981 (Vt. 1991). The Vermont statute in effect
in 1932 provided that "[a] town shall relieve and support poor and indigent persons
residing or found therein, when they are in need thereof .... " VT. GEN. LAWS § 4215
(1917). It is also provided that "Upon the death of a property owner who has been as-
sisted by a town under the provisions of this chapter, such town may recover against his
estate the amount it has expended for such assistance .... " VT. GEN. LAWS § 4224
(1917).
105. See Jarvis, 587 A.2d at 983.
106. "This standard ... is in conflict with our statute which only exempts lands
given to a 'public, pious, or charitable use.' Our statute does not provide a blanket ex-
emption for municipally owned lands, which it easily could have, as evidenced by the
provision exempting state-owned land." Id. at 987.
107. Id. at 987.
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the Connecticut Supreme Court decision in American Trading
Real Estate Properties, Inc., the Vermont court held:
[L] and which is owned by a municipality is presumed to be
given to a public use. However, this presumption can be
rebutted by demonstrating that the town has abandoned
any plans for the land. Evidence to be considered in deter-
mining this issue may include the reason the property was
acquired by the town, uses the town has made of the prop-
erty since acquisition, and whether the town has
manifested an intention to use the property in the future.18
Applying this approach, the court held that the presumption
of dedication to a public use had been overcome. First, the town
had not chosen to acquire the land for a stated public purpose.
It had been taken in settlement of a debt.1°9 Second, the town
had made no public use of the property while it held title."0
Third, by conveying the land to a private individual, the town
demonstrated that it had no intent of using the land for a pub-
lic use in the future."'
The states have not been unanimous, however, in deeming
tax-reverted land to be held in a proprietary capacity. The su-
preme court of Washington decided early on that adverse
possession would not run against the title to land held by a
county acquired pursuant to a tax sale."2 In so holding, the
court stated:
[Wie are unable to see that the acquiring the land and
holding it thereafter is any less the exercise of a right
emanating in the power of taxation than is the levy and
imposition of the tax in the first instance. All of the rights
of the county here involved are traceable to and rest in the
sovereign power of taxation. It is not a proprietary right or
power exercised by the county in either instance, but
purely governmental, looking to the administration of
108. Jarvis, 587 A.2d at 987 (citations omitted).
109. See id. at 988.
110. See id.
111. See id. This last element is particularly difficult for a municipality. Any time a
municipality sells land, by definition, the municipality cannot have any future public
plans for the land. That should not be taken as evidence that the land had not previ-
ously been dedicated to a public use, but rather shows only that the municipality has
chosen not to continue owning the land in the future.
112. See Gustaveson v. Dwyer, 145 P. 458 (Wash. 1915), affig en banc on reh'g 139 P.
194 (Wash. 1914).
VOL. 31:2
Adverse Possession of Municipal Land
governmental functions. We are of the opinion that the
general statute of limitations, though by its terms made
applicable to counties, does not run against the county in
favor of an adverse possessor of the land while the title of
the land rests in the county.
113
Several years later, the Washington court reached the same
conclusion as to land held by a town.""
More recently, a number of courts have followed Washing-
ton's lead and held that land acquired through nonpayment of
taxes is held for a "public use" and is thus protected from ad-
verse possession."5 In those cases, the courts recognized that
the land at issue had been received in lieu of the taxes that had
been due and concluded that acquisition and ownership of land
in lieu of taxes is a public function."16 One court also noted that
the legislature had tried to make tax sales and tax titles more
attractive to prospective purchasers, so as to make it easier for
the municipalities to sell them."7 Permitting adverse possession
of such land undermines the legislature's goal and may dis-
courage prospective purchasers."8 But ultimately, in determin-
ing "whether the duty of collection of taxes placed by legislative
mandate on local governments ... is not in fact a governmental
function," the court relied on comments from a 1973 Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court case:
[Views as to what constitutes a public use necessarily
vary with changing conceptions of the scope and functions
of government, so that today there are familiar examples of
such use which formerly would not have been so consid-
ered. As governmental activities increase with the growing
complexity and integration of society, the concept of 'public
use' naturally expands in proportion."9
113. 145 P. at 460.
114. See Johnson v. Burgeson, 170 P.2d 311 (Wash. 1946).
115. See Kellison v. McIsaac, 559 A.2d 834, 837 (N.H. 1989); Torch v. Constantino,
323 A.2d 278, 281 (Pa. Super Ct. 1974); cf Jarvis v. Gillespie, 587 A.2d 981, 987 (Vt.
1991) (distinguishing Kellison based on linguistic differences between the New Hamp-
shire and Vermont statutes).
116. See Kellison, 559 A.2d at 837; Tbrch, 323 A.2d at 281.
117. See 7brch, 323 A.2d at 280.
118. See id.
119. See id. (quoting Dornan v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 200 A. 834, 840 (Pa.
1938)).
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Thus, while other courts have applied the traditional rule
with little or no thought as to its appropriateness in a modern
setting, the Pennsylvania Superior Court properly considered
the changing role of government in deciding the case before it.
Municipal land dedicated for use as a public street, road, or
highway is a third category of land that has almost universally
been deemed to be held for a public purpose and immune from
adverse possession."' Generally, once the dedication is made
and accepted by the municipality, the land is immune from ad-
verse possession.12' The land may remain subject to the public
trust even if the street is never actually constructed and the
land is used adversely by private interests for many years.2
The simple fact that the land was never actually used as a road
will not support a claim that the municipality has abandoned
it."= It has also been held that a public road retains its public
character even if no public funds are used for its maintenance
and repair." As one court stated:
There are greater reasons why city streets should not be
subject to destruction by nonuse or adverse possession
than can be found applicable to any other kind of property.
No other kind of public property is subject to more persis-
tent and insidious attacks or is less diligently guarded
against seizure.
2 5
Similarly, the Ohio Court of Appeals refused to draw a dis-
tinction between municipal lands held in proprietary and
governmental capacities.2 6 Rejecting early Ohio cases that had
120. See Thurston v. City of Forest Park, 89 S.E.2d 509, 511 (Ga. 1955); City of
Billings v. Pierce Packing Co., 161 P.2d 636, 639-40 (Mont. 1945); West Ctr. Congrega-
tional Church v. Efstathiou, 627 N.Y.S.2d 727 (App. Div. 1995); 1540 Columbus Corp. v.
Cuyahoga County, 589 N.E.2d 467, 471 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990); South Carolina State
Highway Dep't v. Metts, 240 S.E.2d 816,817 (S.C. 1978); Varallo v. Metropolitan Gov't of
Nashville and Davidson County, 508 S.W2d 342, 347 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973); Commercial
Waterway Dist. No. 1 v. Permanente Cement Co., 379 P.2d 178, 179-80 (Wash. 1963).
121. See Devine v. City of Seward, 258 P.2d 302, 305 (Kan. 1953). For an illuminat-
ing discussion of the dedication and acceptance requirements, see American Trading
Real Estate Propertie Inc v. bwn of Trumbull, 574 A.2d 796, 801 (Conn. 1990) and
Kistler v. Gnazzo, No. CV-88-0351677S 0, 1992 WL 361588, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov.
24, 1992), affd, 638 A.2d 1101 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994).
122. See Devine, 258.P.2d at 305.
123. See Rasmussen v. Yentes, 522 N.W.2d 844,848 (Iowa 1994).
124. See Goedecke v. Viking Inv. Corp., 424 P.2d 307,311 (Wash. 1967).
125. Laclede-Christy Clay Products Co. v. St. Louis, 151 S.W. 460, 465 (Mo. 1912);
see also City of Billings v. Pierce Packing Co., 161 P.2d 636, 640 (Mont. 1945).
126. See City of Bryan v. KilIgallon, No. WMS-81-6, 1981 WL 5791, at *2 (Ohio Ct.
App. Sept. 25, 1981).
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permitted adverse possession of proprietary municipal land, the
court stated:
The setting aside of land for future public use in order to
provide for orderly development is, in and of itself, a valu-
able use of land resources. That the public might later be
deprived of the use of such land by operation of the statute
of limitations imposes upon municipalities the burden of
continual inspection of all public lands. Such a burden
would be prohibitive and contrary to the public interest.
127
For purposes of defining a "public use," some state courts
have applied the concept of the "public" more restrictively than
have other states. In those states, the "public" refers to more
than just the inhabitants of the municipality. It includes all of
the citizens of the state generally.128 The Illinois Supreme Court
noted that "the public right and public use must be in the peo-
ple of the state at large, and not in the inhabitants of a
particular local district." 29 This being the case, the court held
that the claimant could adversely possess part of a schoolhouse
lot because, while the lot was dedicated to educational pur-
poses, it was used only by the student-citizens of the municipal-
ity, and not by the citizens of the state in general.'30 Following
this line of analysis, it was held subsequently that a municipal
parking lot was not dedicated to a public use, and thus a por-
tion of it could be adversely possessed.3 '
Oklahoma courts have reached the opposite conclusion as to
school land:
127. Id. at *2.
128. See Brown v. Trustees of Schools, 79 N.E. 579, 580 (Ill. 1906).
129. Id. at 580; see also Sears v. Fair, 397 P.2d 134, 137 (Okla. 1964) ("The test as to
whether a matter is a public right or a private right appears to be whether the right is
such as to affect the public generally or to merely affect a class of individuals within the
political subdivision.").
130. See Brown, 79 N.E. at 581 ("The people of the state in general have no interest,
in common with the inhabitants of a school district, in the schoolhouse site or the pro-
ceeds of it. The use and the right are confined to the particular local district, and ... the
statute of limitations was a good defense.").
131. See Wanless v. Wraight, 559 N.E.2d 798, 801 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). But cf Savoie
v. Town of Bourbonnais, 90 N.E.2d 645,649 (Ill. App. Ct. 1950) (finding that a ditch built
to drain a public highway and keep it open for traffic was sufficiently public to protect it
from adverse possession and stating that "public rights or uses are those in which the
public has an interest in common with the people of such municipality, whereas private
rights or uses are those which the inhabitants of a local district enjoy exclusively, and
the public has no interest therein").
WINTR 1998]
502 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
The ownership of school property is generally in the local
district or school board as trustee for the public at large.
Such property occupies the status of public property and is
not to be regarded as the private property of the school dis-
trict by which it is held or wherein it is located.'
Because school land in Oklahoma is deemed to be held in a
public capacity, it is not subject to adverse possession. 133
The changing nature of a municipal government's role is well
illustrated by a New Hampshire case which examined a parcel
of land and its use from the founding of the Republic to the pre-
sent.3 1 The court held that municipally owned land along the
Atlantic Ocean originally maintained as open space (originally
for an ox common and cow common, and then later for fisher-
men's use) had been held in a governmental capacity. 5 It is
unlikely that many local governments will maintain ox or cow
commons today, but parks, open spaces, wetlands, and other
low-level uses are more popular and necessary than ever. It is
important that the law not be locked in to an artificial and ob-
solete definition of "governmental" functions.
II. THE GOVERNMENTAIIPROPRIETARY DISTINCTION SHOULD
BE ELIMINATED IN FAVOR OF FULL PROTECTION FOR
MUNICIPALLY OWNED LAND
Those who argue against the governmental/proprietary
distinction in tort law generally favor its abandonment so as to
broaden the imposition of liability on the municipality for the
negligence of its agents. 3 Recognizing that "a primary concern
of the judiciary [is] to protect the individual against unjust
governmental activity,"37 this expansion of municipal liability
in the tort arena appears to make sense. It seems unjust not to
compensate an injured person simply because of the identity of
132. James v. Union Graded Sch. Dist. No. 2, 207 P.2d 241, 244 (Okla. 1949)
(quoting 47 AM. JUR. Schools § 65).
133. See Merritt Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Jones, 249 P.2d 1007, 1008-09 (Okla.
1952).
134. Town of Hampton v. Palmer, 153 A.2d 796 (N.H. 1959).
135. See id. at 801.
136. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
137. Austin v. Mayor of Baltimore, 405 A.2d 255, 271 (Md. 1979) (Cole, J., dissent-
ing).
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the party causing the harm.' Having said this, however, it does
not follow that the abandonment of this distinction in the
adverse possession area should render all municipal land
subject to adverse possession.
The considerations involved in protecting municipal land
ownership are vastly different than those related to the com-
pensation of persons injured by negligent municipal agents. In
the adverse possession context, the claimant is seeking title to
government-owned land merely based on his use and occupancy
of that land for a period of time. There is no suggestion that the
government has somehow caused the claimant harm.'3 9 Instead,
the claimant actually seeks to harm the public (or at least his
fellow municipal residents) by taking a public resource-land
owned by the municipality-for himself without compensation.
That different considerations lie behind municipal tort and
adverse possession cases is demonstrated by the courts'
differing analyses of the governmental/proprietary distinction
in the two contexts. In cases involving alleged adverse
possession of municipal land held for purposes of a public road
or highway, the courts have held that such ownership is
governmental in nature. 40 In contrast, many courts have held
that the maintenance of streets and public ways is a "private
proprietary obligation of municipal corporations" 4' for purposes
of liability for negligence.' It is significant, however, that very
few courts addressing the possible adverse possession of
municipal property have cited to tort cases when analyzing the
governmental/proprietary function issue, or vice versa.'
Given the difficulties and uncertainties inherent in the
governmental/proprietary distinction, it makes sense to
138. See id.
139. Cases involving estoppel, in which a claimant seeks title based on the affirma-
tive actions and representations of the municipalities' agents, are distinguishable from
cases of 'pure" adverse possession. Some states will allow such claims even though
adverse possession would not be permitted. See Sioux City v. Johnson, 165 N.W2d 762,
767-68 (Iowa 1969); Halverson v. Village of Deerfield, 322 N.W2d 761, 767 (Minn.
1982).
140. See State v. Simpson, 397 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1964); Town of Chouteau v. Blank-
enship, 152 P.2d 379, 383 (Okla. 1944); Town of West Seattle v. West Seattle Land &
Improvement Co., 80 P. 549, 550 (Wash. 1905); Thurston v. City of Forest Park, 89
S.E.2d 509,511 (Ga. 1955).
141. Mayor of Baltimore v. Eagers, 173 A. 56,59 (Md. 1934).
142. See id. at 60; City of Tallahassee v. Kaufman, 100 So. 150, 152 (Fla. 1924).
143. But see Mount v. Curran, 657 P.2d 392, 395 (Alaska 1982) ("[W]e have refused
to adopt [the governmental/proprietary distinction] in the context of governmental tort
liability."); Barnard v. Gaumer, 361 P.2d 778, 781 (Colo. 1961) (holding that plaintiff had
not established the elements for adverse possession of a city park, but noting that
adverse possession may be established under Colorado tort law).
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abandon it in the tort context to the benefit of injured
claimants. Thus, municipalities should be universally liable in
tort. These difficulties and uncertainties also support
abandoning the distinction in the property context. However, in
this area, the abandonment should be in favor of protection for
all municipally owned land, regardless of the capacity in which
it is held. More courts should follow the lead of the Minnesota
Supreme Court, which expressly refused to distinguish between
governmental and proprietary uses and agreed with the city
that "lands held by a municipality are, by definition,
appropriated to public use."1"
A. The Loss of Municipally Owned Land Through Adverse
Possession Occurs in a Substantial Number of Cases
and Threatens Numerous Parcels of Land
Upon learning of the doctrine of adverse possession, the typi-
cal law student assumes it to be one of those interesting relics
from the days of the frontier, with little, if any, relevance for a
practitioner today.'5 How much more unlikely and uncommon,
the reader asks, is adverse possession against a municipality?
In fact, the large number of cases discussed in this article,
many of which are as recent as the 1980's, illustrate that this is
not an uncommon problem.
Statistics from some major U.S. cities help put the picture
into perspective. In January 1995, New York City owned nearly
3,000 rental buildings, many of which had been taken from
landlords who had stopped paying real estate taxes. 14r By 1995,
Baton Rouge, Louisiana had acquired some 6,000 tax-reverted
parcels. 147 In early 1995, the city of Fort Worth, Texas identified
771 "surplus properties," most of which were vacant lots or
144. Fischer v. City of Sauk Rapids, 325 N.W.2d 816, 818 (Minn. 1982). The Fischer
court, however, did recognize an exception to this rule where "the municipality has
abandoned the use of the land and is therefore estopped from asserting a claim to it."
Id. at 819.
145. See Sprankling, supra note 66, at 873 n.279. ("Judging by the surprise ex-
pressed by most first year law students upon introduction to the doctrine [of adverse
possession], I suspect that only a small group of owners has knowledge of the law.").
This author's experience corresponds with that of Professor Sprankling.
146. See Lloyd Chrein, Unhappily Ever After--Good Intentions Can't Save Some
Landlords from Losing Their Buildings, NEWSDAY, Jan. 13, 1995, at D1.
147. See Adrian Angelette, Assessor Sees Tax Income to be Tapped, BATON ROUGE
ADVOC., Nov. 8, 1995, at 12A.
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deteriorating structures.148 In October 1996, the city of Newark,
New Jersey auctioned off ninety city properties, most of which
had been seized for non-payment of taxes. 9
Given the large number of parcels held by municipal owners,
it is reasonable to expect that some of them will be overlooked
by municipal employees. This fact does not diminish the value
of the parcels as assets held by the municipality, as they ulti-
mately may be put to public use or sold with the proceeds
applied to public needs.
The sheer number of parcels held by municipalities is not the
only significant factor. The potential value of those parcels to a
municipality is also striking. Two recent sales in California
serve as examples. Foster City agreed to sell land to a high tech
company for $24.5 million. 0 The city had acquired that land in
a foreclosure sale for $5.1 million, and had paid another $4.2
million in outstanding assessments and fees.'5 ' Because the city
had not actually dedicated the land to any specific public use,
and later sold it to a private company, many states would have
treated it as proprietary land subject to adverse possession. 51
Similarly, the city council of Westminster, California voted to
sell a deteriorated school auditorium built in the 1920s for
$630,000, which will partially fund a new community arts cen-
ter.153 Some states have a rule that a sale of land to a private
individual demonstrates that the land was not held for public
use.154 Under such a rule, Westminster's land would have been
subject to loss through adverse possession, and its value lost to
the city.
This phenomenon of large numbers of municipally held par-
cels, many of which are quite valuable, is another reason
legislatures should consider extending protection from adverse
possession to all municipal land. When land is taken for non-
payment of taxes, the municipality now has an asset it did not
148. See Jack Z. Smith, Fort Worth Studies Plan to Get Homes for Surplus Lots,
FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Mar. 8, 1995, at 26.
149. See Jordan, supra note 58, at 33.
150. See Simon, supra note 43, at A15.
151. See id
152. See supra Part I.C.3.
153. See John Pope, Westminster City Sale of Land is Back On, L.A. TIMES, July 12,
1996, at B2.
154. See generally Lewis v. Village of Lyons, 389 N.YS.2d 674, 676 (App. Div. 1976)
(holding that previous conveyance of similarly obtained parcel by village to private in-
dividuals established alienability of subject parcel and rendered it susceptible to
adverse possession); Jarvis v. Gillespie, 587 A.2d 981, 988 (Vt. 1991) (holding that the
parcel was not given to public use, as manifested by the town's conveyance to private
individual, and thus was not exempt from claims of adverse possession).
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plan to acquire155 and less tax revenue than expected to support
its services. The municipality should not be further penalized
by a system that demands that it run a permanent real estate
sales office (at additional taxpayer expense) or risk losing the
land received in lieu of tax payments.
Because tax-reverted land ownership by municipalities is in-
creasing, and because that land is a valuable resource for the
municipalities, state legislatures should protect the land by
rendering it statutorily immune from adverse possession.
B. Some Excellent Statutory Models Exist
In a few states, land owned by municipalities is expressly
protected from adverse possession by statute. In Alabama, for
example, the statute states simply: "There is no limitation of
the time within which a county or municipal corporation may
commence an action for the recovery of its lands."156
Similar provisions appear in the statutes of Alaska,57
Mississippi,158 and Oregon.' Colorado's statute likewise pro-
vides that the statute of limitations does not apply to municipal
claims for land, and then clarifies that no possession of munici-
pal land, "no matter how long continued ... shall ever ripen
into any title, interest or right""6 against the municipality.
Not surprisingly, the cases decided under these statutes have
consistently held that municipally owned land is immune from
adverse possession, without regard to the capacity in which it is
held.16 1 This bright-line rule reduces litigation and eliminates
155. The fact that the government did not choose to acquire these specific parcels
for a designated purpose may explain why so many of them are forgotten for many
years.
156. ALA. CODE § 6-2-31(b) (1993).
157. See ALASKA STAT. § 29.71.010 (Michie 1996).
158. See MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 104; MISS CODE ANN. § 15-1-51 (1995).
159. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 12.250, 275.027 (1995).
160. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-41-101(2) (1982).
161. See Jefferson County v. McClinton, 293 So. 2d 294, 297 (Ala. 1974); Bentley
Family Trust v. Lynx Enters., Inc., 658 P.2d 761, 766 (Alaska 1983); City of Canon City
v. Cingoranelli, 740 P.2d 546, 547 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987); Board of Educ. v. Loague, 405 So.
2d 122, 124-125 (Miss. 1981). In Coos County u. State, 734 P.2d 1348, 1360 (Or. 1987),
the court held that the statute protected the county's land, even from adverse
possession by the state, noting that "ORS 12.250 and ORS 275.027 are properly viewed
not as limiting the ability of adverse possessors to acquire title to county lands, but as
removing an impediment to the county's ability to defend its record title to real
property." Id.; cf Highline Sch. Dist. No. 401 v. Port of Seattle, 548 P.2d 1085, 1089
(Wash. 1976) (permitting adverse possession of a school district's land by a municipal
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uncertainty in title. Indeed, in states with this specific statu-
tory protection, there are very few reported decisions on the
issue at all.'62
Legislation expressly immunizing municipal land from ad-
verse possession is the simplest and most efficient method for
providing such protection. Leaving the decision to the courts is
fraught with difficulties. First, many courts are hesitant to
change long-standing court-made rules on the principle of stare
decisis 6 3 Second, the courts may feel it is the legislature's role
to make such a change."6 Third, appellate courts are not neces-
sarily accustomed to resolving claims of adverse possession of
municipal land on a routine basis in every state.165 If no claim-
ant or municipality chooses to pursue an appeal to the state's
highest court, it could be many years before the court has an
opportunity to even consider changing the rule to more fully
protect municipal land.
Even when presented with such a case, a court might easily
resolve the case on some other ground such as lack of proof of
adverse possession,'6 or by finding that the property had not
been dedicated to a public use. 67 Given the somewhat random
airport authority because "[h]owever valid the policies which underlie the rule against
acquisition of municipal properties when the claimant is a private party, nothing favors
its application where another unit of government seeks to acquire the property
interest."); Melvin v. Parker, 78 So. 2d 477, 481 (Miss. 1955) ("Regardless of the extent
and quality of the adverse possession exercized over the lots after their acquisition,
under the facts in this case, the appellants were not entitled to claim therefor until title
passed again into private ownership.").
162. There were no reported cases under the statute in Alabama, only one case in
Colorado, City of Canon City v. Cingoranelli, 740 P.2d 546 (Colo. 1987), and only two
cases in Alaska. See Bentley Family Trust v. Lynx Enters., 658 P.2d 761 (Alaska 1983);
Mount v. Curran, 657 P2d 392 (Alaska 1982). All of the reported cases held that the
statute did not run against a municipality.
163. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250, 1281 (Cal.
1975) ("The doctrine of stare decisis applies with special force to rules of property on
which those engaged in business transactions have relied in gauging the probable re-
turns on their acquisitions and investments."). But see McBryde Sugar Co. Ltd. v.
Robinson, 504 P.2d 1330, 1335 (Haw. 1973), adhered to on reh'g, 517 P.2d 26 (Haw. 1973)
("This court ... has 'rejected a doctrine of disability at self-correction.' We believe that
the doctrine of stare decisis is subordinate to legal reasons and justice and we should
not be unduly hesitant to overrule a former decision when to do so would bring about
what is the considered manifest justice." (citation omitted)).
164. See Alder v. Salt Lake City, 231 P. 1102, 1103 (Utah 1924) ("If the exception [to
municipal immunity for torts involving non-governmental functions] is to be extended
to parks and playgrounds, the Legislature and not the courts should determine the
question.").
165. For example, 35 years passed between the Connecticut Supreme Court's two
landmark decisions in 1955 and 1990. See supra text accompanying notes 89 and 101.
166. See Barnard v. Gaumer, 361 P.2d 778, 781 (Colo. 1961).
167. See Meshberg v. Bridgeport City Trust Co., 429 A.2d 865, 868-69 (Conn. 1980).
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manner in which cases are presented to appellate courts, it is
far more sensible for state legislatures to confront the problem
directly and resolve it clearly, once and for all.
States considering the option of protecting municipal land
from adverse possession should therefore consider adoption of a
statute that parallels those of Alabama and Colorado.
C. Partial Protection for Municipal Land Is Not Sufficient
1. Several State Statutes Provide Protection for Specific
Categories of Municipal Land-A number of state legislatures
have elected to provide express protection from adverse posses-
sion only for municipal land dedicated to specific purposes." By
far the most widely protected areas are that of roads and high-
ways.169 As discussed above, roads and highways have
historically been considered inherently governmental by the
courts for purposes of adverse possession analysis17 and have
consistently been protected by courts even in the absence of
statutes.71 Not content to leave such protection to the courts,
however, many state legislatures have adopted statutes pre-
venting adverse possession of all or some of the following: roads,
public ways, highways, streets and alleys, sometimes even a
public park or square.
7 1
168. See supra note 7.
169. See supra note 121.
170. This differs from the treatment of roads and highways in tort claims. See supra
Part I.B.
171. See supra Part I.C.
172. See ARK CODE ANN. § 22-1-201(a) (Michie 1996) ("public thoroughfare, road,
highway, or public park"); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.050(1) (Michie 1992) ('street, alley
or other public easement"); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 247.190 (West 1990) ("public
highways"); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5821 (West 1987) ('public highway, street,
alley, or any other public ground"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.01 (West 1988) ('public way
... [or] square"); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-202(1) (1995) ('public road, street, or alley"); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 1-45 (1996) ("public road, street, lane, alley, square or public way"); OR.
REv. STAT. § 221.750 (1995) ("streets, highways, for] parks"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-
13 (1996) ('streets, lanes, avenues, alleys, parks or public squares"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
19, § 1102 (1987) ("highway"); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.29(2)(c) (West 1997) (protecting
land held 'for highway purposes, including but not limited to widening, alteration, relo-
cation, improvement, reconstruction and construction"). While not directly protecting
municipal land from adverse possession, Oklahoma provides: 'The title to streets, roads
and public ways within the limits of a municipality which have been dedicated and
accepted by the municipal governing body is held by the municipality in trust for public
use and enjoyment." OiLA. STAT. tit. 11, § 36-101 (1991).
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Schoolhouses and school lands have been specifically immu-
nized from adverse possession by statute in some states.173 This
parallels the protection provided to such lands in the original
grants of land from the United States to the states upon their
admission to the Union.'17 In the absence of such statutes, a few
courts have concluded that land used for school purposes bene-
fits only the local community, is not dedicated to "the public,"
and is, therefore, subject to adverse possession.1 75
Another category of municipal land use that a few states
have chosen to protect statutorily is that involving waterworks
and other public utilities.76 Massachusetts amended its statute
in 1987 to prevent adverse possession of land "held for conser-
vation, open space, parks, recreation, water protection, wildlife
protection or other public purpose."'77
Not surprisingly, the straightforward guidance provided by
these statutes has made it simple for the courts to resolve
claims of adverse possession. If the land is covered by the stat-
ute, then adverse possession is not permitted.7 s
Despite the statutes straightforward application, it is not
entirely clear what rationale motivated these state legislatures
to adopt these limited and piecemeal statutes. That is, why is a
"public thoroughfare, road, highway, or public park""' more
deserving of statutory protection than land around the
courthouse, city hall, or municipal park? And why does a public
utility deserve more statutory protection than the town square,
the library and the department of public works?
Whenever a statute applies to a narrow category of land, a
danger exists that the public, the attorneys, or the courts will
173. See LA. CoNST. art. 9, § 4(B) ("Lands and mineral interests of ... a school
board ... shall not be lost by prescription."); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/13-111
(West 1993) (immunizing "school and seminary lands" from the seven-year statute of
limitations applicable to adverse possession under color of title, but subjecting this land
to adverse possession under the longer, general 40-year statute); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 477:34 (1992) ("No person shall acquire by prescription a right to any part of a ...
schoolhouse or church lot.., by fencing.., or in any way occupying it adversely for any
length of time.").
174. See Latovick, supra note 5, at 952-63.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 128-31.
176. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 22-1-202 (Michie 1996) ("municipal waterworks"); CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1007 (West 1982) ("land, water, water right, easement, or other property
whatsoever dedicated to a public use by a public utility"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.01
(West 1988) ("levee"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 17A-2-534 (1995) ("[Amny canal, ditch, or the
like... shall be deemed a public use and for a public benefit.").
177. MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 260, § 31 (1996).
178. See Neyland v. Hunter, 668 S.W2d 530, 532 (Ark. 1984); Averett v. Utah
County Drainage Dist. No. 1, 763 P.2d 428,430 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
179. ARK. CODE ANN. § 22-1-201(a) (Michie 1996).
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overlook it and permit protected municipal land to be lost
through adverse possession.18 A statute which uniformly ex-
empts all municipal land from adverse possession, regardless of
the use to which it is put, would eliminate this problem. A
broad, uniform statute is preferable to the piecemeal approach
which protects one or two types of land but leaves others of ar-
guably equal importance to the municipality unprotected.
In short, state statutes taking apiecemeal approach to pro-
tection from adverse possession could be simplified and made
more consistent by adopting a rule protecting all municipal
land from adverse possession. The statutes of Alabama and
Colorado could serve as models for legislatures contemplating
such legislation. 8'
2. Two State Statutes Expressly Permit Adverse Possession of
Municipal Land-Two states have statutes that seem to subject
municipal land of any character to adverse possession. Florida's
statute subjects municipalities to the same statutes of limita-
tions that apply to civil actions generally. 2 Wisconsin's statute
provides specifically that title to land held by a municipality
"may be obtained by adverse possession" if the adverse user
holds the property for more than twenty years." Wisconsin's
statute, however, does exempt from adverse possession high-
ways held by the state or a political subdivision.'
Somewhat surprisingly, the Florida courts have held that
municipal land held for a public purpose is not subject to ad-
verse possession, no matter how long the possession
continues.8 ' Despite the clear language of the statute, which
would seem to make no exceptions, the Florida cases have been
180. See generally Latovick, supra note 5, at 969-72 (arguing that some state courts
have ignored their own state's adverse possession laws). Mistakes as to the law of ad-
verse possession have been more frequent than might be supposed.
181. See discussion supra Part II.B.
182. See FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 95.011 (Harrison 1996) ("A civil action ... including
one brought by... a political subdivision of the state, [or] a municipality, ... shall be
barred unless begun within the time prescribed in this chapter....").
183. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.29(1) (West 1997) (providing that adverse possession is
available against "the state or a city, village, town, county, school district, sewerage
commission, sewerage district or any other unit of government within this state").
184. See id. § 893.29(2)(c) (protecting from adverse possession property held "for
highway purposes, including but not limited to widening, alteration, relocation, im-
provements, reconstruction and construction").
185. See Waterman v. Smith, 94 So. 2d 186, 189 (Fla. 1957).
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consistent since 1957 in affirming that land dedicated for public
use cannot be acquired by adverse possession."'
The Wisconsin courts, on the other hand, have been inconsis-
tent in applying the statute of limitations. In an unpublished
opinion, Van de Casteele v. St. Thomas Aquinas Congregation,
the Wisconsin Court of Appeals noted that "St. Thomas could
not have acquired by adverse possession any property dedicated
by the city of Milwaukee for public use."87 However, in so hold-
ing, the court relied on a 1922 decision of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court,'88 which predated Wisconsin's 1931 adoption of
its statute expressly allowing adverse possession of municipal
land."'89 The existence of contrary statutory authority adopted
after the time of the cited case limits the relevance of Van de
Casteele.
More recently, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals permitted ad-
verse possession of a state highway despite its public
dedication.' 9 In another case the same court held that the
plaintiff had failed to establish adverse possession of a base-
ment under a city street because he had not met the applicable
forty-year statute of limitations.' 9' If this alleged encroachment
had been barred because the street was dedicated to a public
186.. See id. at 189; Bonifay v. Garner, 503 So. 2d 389, 395-96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1987); Seaside Properties, Inc. v. State Road Dep't, 190 So. 2d 391, 394 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1966); Laube v. City of Stuart, 107 So. 2d 757, 760-61 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
187. Van de Casteele v. St. Thomas Aquinas Congregation, No. 79-1960, 1980 WL
99512, at ***4 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 1980).
188. Klinkert v. Racine, 188 N.W. 72, 73 (Wis. 1922) (holding that the city held title
to an alley in its governmental capacity and that adverse possession was not possible
because the city had no power to convey title to the alley for private use).
189. See WIS. STAT. ch. 79, § 3 (1931) (allowing adverse possession of "any real es-
tate" (emphasis added)); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 893.29(1) (West 1997); 65 Op. Wis. Att'y
Gen. 207, 210-13 (1976).
190. See Wisconsin Dep't of Transp. v. Black Angus Steak House, Inc., 330 N.W.2d
240, 241-42 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983). The court noted the following:
When the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, no rule of judicial con-
struction is permitted, and this court must implement the express intent of the
legislature by giving the language its ordinary and accepted meaning.... [the
relevant statute] clearly provides that a person has the statutory right of adverse
possession against state property if the statutory requirements are met. The
statute makes no exception for state highway property.
Id. at 241. Following this decision, the Wisconsin legislature amended its statute to
expressly protect highways from adverse possession. See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 893.29(2)(c)
(west 1997).
191. See Petropoulos v. City of West Allis, 436 N.W.2d 880, 882-83 (wis. Ct. App.
1989).
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use and was therefore immune from adverse possession,1 92 it
would not have been necessary for the court to rely on the ap-
plicable time period for occupancy. It is not entirely clear, then,
whether municipal land dedicated to a public use is immune
from adverse possession in Wisconsin.
Whatever one's position on adverse possession of municipally
owned land, the law ought to be clear. Where the statutes say
one thing but the courts feel free to follow common law excep-
tions, the inconsistency in the system is untenable. The
legislatures in these two states should reconsider their statutes
in light of the judicially created uncertainty.
Simply clarifying the question of whether land devoted to
public use is immune from adverse possession, however, is not
sufficient to solve the problem. The difficult issue of defining
just what uses are "public" enough to merit protection remains,
as does the problem of losing valuable municipal property with-
out compensation because it has been deemed proprietary in its
capacity.
As discussed above, adoption of a statute protecting all mu-
nicipal land from adverse possession would be most appropriate
for at least four reasons. First, such a rule is readily understood
and easily administered.9 ' Second, it would eliminate the cur-
rent confusion as to whether land dedicated to a public use is
immune from adverse possession. Third, it would avoid the dif-
ficulties described in Part I.C.3 above, relating to the
determination of which uses are, in fact, "public." Fourth, it
would protect valuable municipal assets from loss to aggressive
trespassers. 94
CONCLUSION
The time has come to abolish the governmental/proprietary
distinction in adverse possession cases and to prevent adverse
possession of any municipally owned land, regardless of the
192. The Petropoulos court held that the 40-year statute in effect at the time the oc-
cupancy began was controlling, as opposed to the 20-year statute adopted in 1979. See
id. at 882. Therefore, the 1983 amendment protecting highways was not relevant.
193. See supra notes 157-67 and accompanying text.
194. Certainly if it were any municipal asset other than land being taken by these
trespassers, the trespassers would be considered thieves and prosecuted as such. It is
only the peculiarities of the adverse possession rules, developed to protect the land title
system from stale claims as to land ownership, that protect those who would take mu-
nicipal property for themselves without paying for it.
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capacity in which it is held. State legislatures in those states
where municipal land is not fully protected should adopt a
statute providing that all municipal land is immune from
adverse possession. The statutes in Alabama and Colorado can
serve as models for such new legislation.
Failing such a simple but comprehensive approach, the courts
should, at a minimum, expand the categories of land deemed to
be held in a governmental capacity to reflect changes in the role
of municipal governments and modern recognition of the value of
undeveloped land. Whether done by accident or design, munici-
palities should not be punished for leaving land in its natural
state. A better approach would be for the courts to adopt the rea-
soning of the Minnesota Supreme Court that "lands held by a
municipality are, by definition, appropriated to public use,"195 and
are, therefore, immune from adverse possession.
195. Fischer v. City of Sauk Rapids, 325 N.W2d 816, 818 (Minn. 1982) (holding that
adverse possession against the government is not allowed under the state's statutory
scheme).
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